

VZCZCXRO2744
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHC #8367/01 2032242
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 212236Z JUL 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6871
INFO ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 5537
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 078367

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2018
TAGS: [PREL](#) [NATO](#) [EUN](#)
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR JULY 22 NATO DISCUSSION ON NATO-EU
CRISIS MANAGEMENT

REF: A. USNATO 253
[1](#)B. STATE 76654

Classified By: EUR DAS William Lucas, Acting, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request, please see paragraphs 3-4.

[1](#)2. (SBU) Background. On July 22, the French Permanent Representative to NATO will present to North Atlantic Council (NAC) counterparts a new French non-paper titled, "Initiative aimed at establishing a 'high-level group' to coordinate EU-NATO crisis management." The non-paper builds on France's October 2007 non-paper on NATO/EU relations, FM Kouchner's remarks at the July 7 high-level NATO-EU seminar in Paris, and French Secretary of State for European Affairs Jeanne-Pierre Jouyet July 16 brief to the NAC on "Priorities Of the French EU Presidency," (ref A).

[1](#)3. (C) While making clear that the U.S. welcomes this paper, finds it promising, and is ready to implement most of it, Mission should also use the following points to lay markers for further discussion on some of its basic elements, which reflect trends in NATO-EU relations that we are concerned could limit NATO's freedom of decision/actions.

[1](#)4. (C/Rel to NATO) Begin Talking Points:

-- The United States welcomes this initiative as an important step in efforts to ensure effective consultations and cooperation between NATO and the EU before and during crisis management situations. We are keen to work with Allies and EU partners to pursue greater cooperation as effectively as possible, along with other efforts, for example, in the Comprehensive Approach Plan. To that end I have 5 comments or additions to points in the French paper:

-- First, as suggested in the non-paper, and indeed by our leaders at Bucharest, NATO and the EU will often -- not always but often -- work side by side in a theater. To that end, we agree that we should build on the current provisions of NATO-EU cooperation, initially via informal mechanisms. In addition, this "side by side" idea also means we need to consider further how to ensure coherence of effort and unity of command/direction in such theaters.

-- We should discuss this further, bearing in mind that on security and defense issues, we adhere to the principle that it is preferable to act through NATO when the U.S, Europe, and potentially other democratic partners consult and take action together on crisis management situations.

-- The U.S. has also said this principle applies when crisis management is of mixed civil-military nature -- and that just as the EU needs military capability to act, so NATO needs to

increase its ability to use civilian crisis management capabilities. This is only natural. The U.S. understands that there are instances when the EU will, based on such consultations, decide to conduct its own operations where NATO is not engaged.

-- Second, to ensure success of any NATO-EU coordination, consultations of the sort this proposal envisions are crucial, and should be continuous and focus on current crises, whether developing or on-going. In addition, NATO-EU working arrangements should promote cooperation and the exchange of relevant information before/before crises emerge: on strategic planning, early warning, and assessment functions.

-- Third, as our former representative to NATO, Ambassador Nuland, said this spring in Paris: "If we truly believe in a transatlantic comprehensive approach to security -- one that combines the best of our hard and soft power -- we need a place where we can plan and train for such missions as a NATO-EU family." We should discuss further how best to meet these NATO and EU needs for planning for civilian and military missions -- in ways that make the best use of what ultimately is a "single pool" of capabilities of all types.

-- Fourth, we agree that participants at any high level coordination meeting between NATO and the EU staffs should be

STATE 00078367 002 OF 004

agreed between the Secretary Generals of both organizations. In addition, we should consider how individual nations, representatives could be included in more such meetings, at least on an occasional basis as events warrant.

-- Finally, in considering the means for formally launching this initiative, on the basis of co-equal NATO and EU leadership -- we should seek an agreement as early as the December Foreign Ministerial or perhaps we should consider NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer's idea of a joint NATO-EU Summit next spring.

15. (SBU) Post may also draw from the following interagency cleared points on NATO-EU cooperation developed in the run-up to the July 7 NATO-EU seminar:

GENERAL NATO-EU RELATIONS

-- The United States supports stronger European capabilities and a greater European global role. The United States also agrees with the sentiment expressed by President Sarkozy that the roles of NATO and the EU are complementary.

-- We note the seriousness of purpose with which France is approaching the challenges of ensuring security in the 21st century, France's decision to transform its military to a more expeditionary force is one that we have come to ourselves.

-- We also want to welcome France's stated intention to normalize its relationship with a revitalized and transformed NATO, which can only strengthen the Alliance and European defense.

-- The United States supports close cooperation between NATO and the EU. 21 of 26 NATO Allies are also EU members. This overlapping membership is anchored and constantly reinforced by deeply shared democratic values common to both organizations and shared alike across the Atlantic among member states.

-- We maintain a broad and robust relationship with the EU, which includes an active and structured dialogue through a variety of U.S.-EU mechanisms and structures, especially with regard to foreign policy and human rights and democracy.

-- On security and defense issues, however, we adhere to the principle that it is preferable to act through NATO when the U.S., Europe, and potentially other democratic partners consult and take action together. (NOTE: in ref B and previous, the U.S. added that this principle also applies where crisis management is of mixed civil-military nature.)

-- The U.S. is not a member of the EU; NATO offers a forum where we can sit at the same table with our European Allies on an equal footing. Our European Allies recognize the political and practical capabilities that we contribute. There are also compelling practical military operational reasons for using NATO.

-- This is a proven formula for success, given NATO's record of winning the cold war, of extending peace and security across Europe, and of managing security crises in countries such as Afghanistan.

-- At the same time, and this is increasingly so, we recognize and respect the importance of the EU's own security institutions, the resources the EU can bring to crisis management around the world, and the desire for the EU to undertake and lead missions itself when NATO is not present.

NATO-EU COOPERATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

-- Given the variety of security situations around the globe and the multiplicity of crisis management opportunities, the United States accepts and welcomes EU contributions to our common security.

-- At NATO's Heads of State and Government Summit in Bucharest this last April; President Bush affirmed the value the United States places on a stronger European defense capability. Greater European commitment to defense spending

STATE 00078367 003 OF 004

and military capacity benefits both NATO and the EU and makes all the members of the transatlantic community more secure.

-- In order to be effective, especially in a time of overstretched resources and crises around the globe, we must avoid "duplication" of structures that can only lead to zero-sum "competition" for resources in lieu of an increased focus on pooling common resources for the common good. We need more infantry battalions, strategic lift, and police trainers - not more headquarters and planning staffs.

-- Global problems cannot be solved strictly through military means. Sometimes military action is necessary, but military, civilian, economic, and political solutions all have to be interconnected through a comprehensive approach. These needed skill sets are found across NATO and the EU -- of course, preponderantly from throughout their member nations -- a "single pool" of capabilities of all kinds, for crises where NATO, the EU, or both may be involved. Therefore, cooperation is a natural imperative. We understand that neither NATO nor the EU would, or should, want an artificial a priori division of labor into different functional or geographic roles. Just as the EU needs the military capability to act, NATO needs to increase its civilian crisis management capabilities.

-- We already do so much important work together. NATO and the EU cooperate extensively on the ground in a variety of theaters including the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Africa:

- Bosnia: an EU force took over from NATO in 2005;
- Kosovo: the EU will provide approximately 2,000 rule of law and administrative personnel to serve along side 16,000 NATO troops (ref B);
- Afghanistan: the EU is taking on a growing role in police training that supports NATO, the international

community, and the Afghan government;

- Africa: NATO and the EU worked together to lift African Union peacekeepers to Darfur and cooperate on African capacity building.

-- In future settings, as our leaders recognized in Bucharest, NATO and the EU will often -- though not always -- work side by side. We need to plan and prepare for possible EU, NATO, and NATO-EU configurations.

-- As our former representative to NATO, Ambassador Nuland, said this spring in Paris: "if we truly believe in a transatlantic comprehensive approach to security - one that combines the best of our hard and soft power - we need a place where we can plan and train for such missions as a NATO-EU family."

ENSURING COOPERATION IN ONGOING OPERATIONS

-- On the NATO-EU logjam over the Turkey-Cyprus conflict, the U.S. has long reminded all concerned that, however unfortunate this problem is, its genesis -- and more important, its resolution -- is not simply the responsibility of any one nation or institution. The U.S. has long used its good offices where possible to encourage flexibility on this issue, and has welcomed such flexibility where it has been seen. All concerned need to do more to help resolve this in ways that serve the interests of all concerned. The U.S. will certainly do its part to help.

-- Now -- given ongoing operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan --cooperation in the field among our soldiers and diplomats is absolutely essential, since the success of their missions, and even their lives, are at stake. We cannot permit NATO-EU differences over principles block effective cooperation in critical real-world operations. In times of peace, we could collectively afford to ignore these differences and let them fester safe in the knowledge that no lives were at risk. This is no longer the case.

-- In times like these, it also follows that neither organization has an interest in ignoring or excluding our closest friends and Allies. Turkey, which generously contributes to our collective transatlantic security in NATO and is willing to participate in EU-led operations, should be welcome partners in all aspects of European defense. Turkey has a legitimate interest in access to the European Defense Agency, a security agreement with the EU, and in being consulted earlier rather than later on EU missions where they make such valuable contributions. The EU should honor its commitments to Turkey on these issues.

STATE 00078367 004 OF 004

-- An opening by the EU to Turkey should be reciprocated by NATO,s willingness to open the doors to partnership with Cyprus and agree to a security agreement as well.

-- The long-standing Turkey-Cyprus issue will not be solved by (but it might perhaps be helped by) NATO-EU agreements. In fact, any NATO-EU steps might depend on making very clear the fact that those steps are without prejudice to the Turkey-Cyprus issue. That said, a solution to the divided island of Cyprus would do much to unlock closer NATO-EU cooperation. In any case, we cannot wait for a solution on reunification of Cyprus to find solutions to the NATO-EU logjam.

-- In the meantime we must look for short-term solutions that allow practical cooperation on the ground in operations that are critical to all of our collective interest, particularly in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

-- An immediate need exists for a revised NATO Balkans OPLAN. Also, it would help if the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and

the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) could meet regularly to confirm and help de-conflict operational commitments. The fact that they are not regularly discussing KFOR-EULEX issues makes a disconnect between the organizations more likely, which is not acceptable to anyone.

-- It is also important, even now, to pursue the good taskings by our Heads of State at Bucharest on the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, even if in some areas a solution to the current NATO-EU logjam might be a key to implementation. We should consider new and enhanced mechanisms for NATO-EU cooperation, including perhaps for civilian assets, which might be based on familiar principles and elements of the existing NATO-EU agreements, while also taking forward the existing useful agreed mechanisms and applying them to the fullest. We should strengthen our staff-staff and liaison arrangements and feedback on their work.

End Points.
RICE